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WHY RULE 37(e) DOES NOT CREATE A NEW
SAFE HARBOR FOR ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE SPOLIATION
Gal Davidovitch ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

1

Rule 37(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure received
much attention in the lead-up to its promulgation in December 2006
because it appeared to create a safe harbor from spoliation sanctions
2
ordinarily available under Rule 37’s other provisions for parties that
3
inadvertently lose electronic evidence. Proponents of the new rule
applauded the relief it would deliver to litigants who operate sophisticated electronic information systems in good faith but are held accountable when those systems’ routine data-deletion functions cause
4
the loss of information that may be relevant to litigation. The rule’s
opponents criticized it for giving a free pass to parties who lose information to the detriment of their opponents, which in turn may
have the residual effect of creating an incentive for litigants to
shorten the retention period for data destined to be deleted. Both
the proponents and the opponents of Rule 37(e) have it wrong.
Rule 37(e) will not, in most cases, offer any protection that the
federal rules did not already provide. And in those few cases where
∗
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1
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) was originally promulgated as Rule 37(f). This change in
designation came as a result of a 2007 amendment to Rule 37, and was “intended to
be stylistic only.” Id. Therefore, references to Rule 37(f) in the sources cited herein
should generally be read as references to the current Rule 37(e), unless otherwise
indicated.
2
Rule 37 authorizes courts to issue sanctions for discovery abuses. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 37.
3
See, e.g., Helen Bergman Moure, EDD Showcase: Rules and Procedures: Extreme
Makeover, L. TECH. NEWS, Aug. 2005, at 38 (Bergman refers to the new rule as a “safe
harbor”).
4
David Wilner, e-Discovery Worries? Proposed Federal Rules on Electronic Discovery
May Have a Broad Impact, CORP. COUNSELOR, Nov. 2004, available at https://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/NewsEvents/PDFs/200411_CorpCounselor_eDiscWor
ries.pdf.
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37(e) will deliver a novel safe harbor, it will be the result of a jurisdictional idiosyncrasy rather than the rule drafters’ policy. Two factors
combine to reach this result. First, the circumstances under which
Rule 37(e) applies are narrow. The rule requires litigants to satisfy a
three-element foundation, but it also includes an exception that can
override that foundation. Second, Rule 37, as it existed prior to the
addition of subsection (e), already included various requirements
that, when taken in the aggregate, function similarly to the safe harbor that the provision purports to create.
Nevertheless, Rule 37(e) is not entirely irrelevant. It organizes
the pre-existing exceptions in one rule and thus provides guidance to
5
litigants and judges on how to deal with electronic information loss.
Further, although the rule itself does not add much to the procedural law of sanctions, the fact that some litigants may believe that it
does could result in the untoward reactions that the opponents of the
rule feared. For example, companies may still elect “to purge information . . . on an accelerated basis . . . to avoid keeping what could
6
hurt them in litigation.”
Part II of this Comment introduces a framework for applying
Rule 37(e), thereby exposing the narrow applicability of the rule.
Each element is interpreted using a combination of committee notes,
materials used during the rule-making process, and analogies from
cases that have encountered similar elements. Part III focuses on the
different ways Rule 37 can be used to sanction information loss and
how each method creates its own safe harbor, thus obviating the need
for Rule 37(e). This Part also includes a brief analysis of other
sources of law for sanctioning spoliators and their lawyers. Although
Rule 37(e) only concerns sanctions that are based in Rule 37, this
analysis is useful because it emphasizes the law’s reluctance, under alternative sources of authority, to sanction parties that lose information under the circumstances described in Rule 37(e).

5

See Lee H. Rosenthal, A Few Thoughts on Electronic Discovery After December 1,
2006: Sanctions, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 167 (2006), http://thepocketpart.org/
2006/12/5/rosenthal.html.
6
Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Before
the Civil Rules Advisory Comm., 9 (2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery/
0112frcp.pdf. (statement of Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chairperson). For a summary
of Judge Rosenthal’s public comments on the proposed Civil Rule Amendments
submitted to the Committee, see Summary of Testimony and Comments on Ediscovery Amendments, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery/SummaryE-Disc
overyComments.pdf (last visited May 15, 2008).
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II. THE NARROW APPLICATION OF RULE 37(e)
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (“Advisory Committee”)
first became aware of problems with computer-based discovery in
7
1996. At that time, the Advisory Committee recognized that electronically stored information raised “different issues from conven8
tional discovery of paper records.” One such issue is quantity: large
organizations’ computer networks have storage capacities measured
in tetrabytes, one of which is equivalent to 500 million typewritten
9
pages. A second issue is that computer information is dynamic,
10
meaning that it can change without specific direction or knowledge.
For example, “turning a computer on or off can change the informa11
tion it stores.” A third difference is that electronically stored information “may be incomprehensible when separated from the system
12
that created it.” As a result of these differences, the Advisory Committee chose to amend Rule 37.
“Rule 37[e] responds to a distinctive and necessary feature of
computer systems—the recycling, overwriting, and alteration of elec13
tronically stored information that attends normal use.” Since “computer systems lose, alter, or destroy information as part of routine operations,” a party could be exposed to sanctions under Rule 37 more
14
readily than they would with paper documents. Further, not only
can these computer systems be difficult to interrupt, but it is questionable whether, in the interest of expediency, it is desirable to interrupt them; the result would be an accumulation of what could be
15
“duplicative and irrelevant data that must be reviewed.”
After deliberating on these issues, which included a public
comment period and a number of hearings, the Advisory Committee
settled on the following language for the new rule:
(e) Failure to Provide Electronically Stored Information. Absent
exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically

7

COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROC., EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 3 (Sept. 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1105/Excerpt_STReport_CV.pdf.
8
Id. at 4.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROC., supra note 7, at 13.
14
See id.
15
Id.
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stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith op16
eration of an electronic information system.

The following three step foundation for gaining the rule’s protection,
and an exception, are imbedded in the rule:
Step 1: The loss of information must have been due to the operation of an Electronic Information System (EIS).
Step 2: The EIS must have been operating routinely at the time the
information was lost.
Step 3: The litigant responsible for the lost information must have
been operating the EIS in good faith at the time of the loss.
Exception: Notwithstanding the litigant’s ability to satisfy the rule’s
foundation, under exceptional circumstances the litigant may still
be sanctioned.

A. Step 1: What Is an “Electronic Information System”?
The Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure (“Judicial Committee”) included the following examples
of what it considers to be an EIS:
[P]rograms that recycle storage media kept for brief periods
against the possibility of a disaster that broadly affects computer
operations; automatic overwriting of information that has been
“deleted”; programs that change metadata (automatically created
identifying information about the history or management of an
electronic file) to reflect the latest access to particular electronically stored information; and programs that automatically discard
information that has not been accessed within a defined period or
that exists beyond a defined period without an affirmative effort
to store it for a longer period. Similarly, many database programs
automatically create, discard, or update information without spe17
cific direction from, or awareness of, users.

The Judicial Committee indicated that the common denominator
among these systems is that their automatic features are essential to
their operation; suspending or interrupting them would be either
18
prohibitively expensive or burdensome. This characteristic makes
these systems fundamentally different from a hard-copy document retention system, which could ostensibly operate without interrupting
19
an ongoing business.
16

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE & PROC. 168 (Sept. 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ ST092005.pdf#page=168 [hereinafter SUMMARY REPORT].
18
Id.
19
Id.
17
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The Judicial Committee provided the following example:
A data producer can warehouse large volumes of papers without
affecting ongoing activities and can maintain and manage hardcopy records separately from the creation of products or services.
By contrast, electronic information is usually part of the data producer’s activities, whether it be the manufacture of products or
20
the provision of services.

One example of the type of EIS to which this new rule would apply is
a dynamic database. These are databases that are constantly updated
21
by individuals, groups of people, or automatic processes:
For example, data feeds from point-of-sale terminals and salesstaff reports constantly update and change a company’s sales database with new information. Most enterprises could not even
contemplate preserving the vast quantity of data that would be required to determine the exact state of a dynamic database at any
22
moment, days, months, or years earlier.
23

The court in Bob Barker Co. v. Ferguson Safety Products, Inc. addressed
dynamic databases in the context of the propriety of a document request for the production of a database and recognized the infeasibility of preserving a database which is a “dynamic collection of data that
24
changes over time.” The court was careful to note, however, that
documents once part of a software database that may exist at the time
25
of the discovery request would be discoverable.
More mundane electronic information systems also possess dynamic data characteristics. For example, files created in a computer’s
word processing program automatically record and update informa26
tion about that file as it is being accessed and updated. More generally, such metadata, or “data about data,” includes “contextual,
processing, and use information needed to identify and certify the

20

Id.
See Thomas W. Burt & Gregory S. McCurdy, E-Discovery of Dynamic Data and
Real-Time Communications: New Technology, Practical Facts, and Familiar Legal Principles,
115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 166, 169 (2006), http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/08/
burt_and_mccurdy.html.
22
Id.
23
No. C 04 04813 JW, 2006 WL 648674 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2006).
24
Id. at *4.
25
Id.
26
Microsoft, WD97: How to Minimize Metadata in Microsoft Word Documents,
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/223790 (last visited May 15, 2008).
21

DAVIDOVITCH_FINAL

1136

6/12/2008 11:55:30 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1131

scope, authenticity, and integrity of active or archival electronic in27
formation or records.”
B. Step 2: What Is “Routine”?
The Judicial Committee indicated that the “‘routine operation
of an [EIS]’” refers to the “ways in which such systems are generally
designed, programmed, and implemented to meet the party’s technical
28
and business needs.” Further, the Judicial Committee indicated that
“[s]uch features are essential to the operation of electronic informa29
tion systems.” This choice of language indicates that the Judicial
Committee believes that a system’s “routine” operation is more than
just an operation which is periodic or habitual, but rather one that
has a purpose linked to the party’s particular “technical and business
30
needs.” In essence, a determination of whether a system is “routine”
should focus on how the system was operated generally, without regard to the particular facts surrounding the lost information in question.
Document retention policies—companies’ stated policies re31
garding how long they retain data —are precursors to electronic information systems. When determining whether documents were
properly destroyed pursuant to a firm’s document retention policy,
32
courts have discussed the policy’s “reasonableness.” In Stevenson v.
33
Union Pacific Railroad Co., the court evaluated the reasonableness of
34
the defendant’s document retention policy. That case was brought
by a motorist and the estate of his deceased wife after a train operated by the defendant collided with the motorist’s car, injuring the
35
The plaintiffs moved for sanctions
motorist and killing his wife.
against the railroad company for destroying discoverable dispatch
tapes between the train crew and the dispatcher that would have
27

THE SEDONA CONF., THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES AND
COMMENTARY FOR MANAGING INFORMATION AND RECORDS IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE 80
(Charles R. Ragan et al. eds., 2005).
28
SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 17, at 172 (emphasis added).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
See LEXISNEXIS, WHITE PAPER, ELEMENTS OF A GOOD DOCUMENT RETENTION
POLICY 2 (2007), http://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/whitePap
ers/ADI_WP_ElementsOfAGoodDocRetentionPolicy.pdf.
32
Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 204 F.R.D. 425, 428 (E.D. Ark. 2001), rev'd on
other grounds, 354 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 2004).
33
Id.
34
Id. at 430.
35
See Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1087 (E.D. Ark.
2000).

DAVIDOVITCH_FINAL

2008]

6/12/2008 11:55:30 AM

1137

COMMENT
36

probably led to other discoverable evidence. The defendant’s director of dispatching practices and quality assurance testified that “the
purpose of taping conversations between crew members and dispatchers is to monitor the job performance of dispatchers and to re37
solve any question about movement authority that might arise.”
The defendant’s policy required retaining tapes for ninety days before destroying them, sixty days longer than the Federal Railroad
38
Administration’s reported national average. Given the defendant’s
business purpose for retaining the tapes, the court held that the
39
document retention policy was not unreasonable.
Courts will project the analysis they use to evaluate a reasonable
document retention policy onto a routine EIS, particularly because an
EIS will often be a component of a company’s document retention
40
policy, if not the policy itself. Consequently, when an EIS is scrutinized for “routineness” within the meaning of the rule, a party who
cannot provide a business reason for how it chooses to operate its
EIS—as the defendant did in Stevenson with regard to its document
41
retention policy—will not gain the benefit of the rule. To be sure,
the law does not require companies to save “every single scrap of pa42
per in [their] business[es],” and recognizes that “keep[ing] certain
information from getting into the hands of others . . . [is] common in
43
business.”
However, parties that program their EIS to eliminate
data on an accelerated basis solely for the purpose of avoiding discovery during litigation would violate their common law duty to pre44
serve documents that may be subject to litigation.

36

Stevenson, 204 F.R.D. at 430.
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. The court did note, however, that the reasonableness of a document retention policy does not relieve a defendant of the burden to preserve documents that
the defendant knows, or should know, will become material at some point in the future. Id.
40
See Paul French, Electronic Document Retention Policies (and Why Your Clients Need
Them), L. PRAC. TODAY (2004), http://www.abanet.org/lpm/lpt/articles/ftr01045
.html.
41
See Stevenson, 204 F.R.D. at 430.
42
Wiginton v. Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 WL 22439865, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27,
2003). See infra Part III.B.1.c.ii for a more detailed discussion of what a party’s obligation to preserve entails.
43
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005).
44
For a complete discussion of parties’ common law and other obligations to preserve information, see infra Part III.B.1.c.ii.
37
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C. Step 3: When Is a Party Operating in “Good Faith”?
The “good faith” requirement of Rule 37(e) refers to how a
party operated its EIS with regard to the specific information that had
45
been lost.
When Rule 37(e) was originally published for public
comment in 2004, it adopted a negligence test rather than the cur46
rent “good faith” standard. In addition to the “negligence” version
of the rule, an alternate “intentional or reckless” version was also
proposed and was published as a footnote to the “negligence” ver47
sion. The Judicial Committee noted in its comments to the final
version of the rule that the negligence standard offered “no meaningful protection, but rather protected against conduct unlikely to be
48
sanctioned in the first place.” However, the “intentional or reckless” version of the rule was considered too restrictive among those
who contributed opinions during the public comment phase. The
commentators urged that this version of the rule would essentially in49
The Judicial
sulate conduct that should be subject to sanctions.
Committee noted that the final “good faith” version is an intermedi-

45

SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 17, at 169.
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROC., REPORT ON THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE (2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/CVAug04.pdf.
Rule 37(e), as proposed for public comment, stated:
Rule 37. Failure to Make Disclosure or Cooperate in Discovery; Sanctions
(f) Electronically Stored Information. Unless a party violated an order
in the action requiring it to preserve electronically stored information,
a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on the party for
failing to provide such information if:
(1) the party took reasonable steps to preserve the information
after it knew or should have known the information was discoverable in the action; and
(2) the failure resulted from loss of the information because of
the routine operation of the party’s electronic information system.
Id.
47
Id. The “intentional or reckless” version of the Rule reads:
(f) Electronically Stored Information. A court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically
stored information deleted or lost as a result of the routine operation
of the party’s electronic information system unless:
(1) the party intentionally or recklessly failed to preserve the information; or
(2) the party violated an order issued in the action requiring the
preservation of the information.
Id.
48
SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 17, at 169.
49
Id.
46
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ate culpability standard.
The explicit rejection of a “negligence”
standard in favor of a subjective standard implies that a party who
loses information negligently may benefit from the safe harbor, so
long as the party acted in good faith.
Whereas the “routine” element of the rule focuses solely on the
structure of the EIS, the “good faith” element is based on what the
parties did once their obligations to preserve evidence were triggered. The committee notes on the rule emphasized the various ways
in which a preservation obligation may arise, including obligations
51
based in common law, statutes and regulations, agreements between
52
the parties, and court orders. The committee notes go on to state
that “[t]he good faith requirement of Rule 37[e] means that a party
is not permitted to exploit the routine operation of an information
system to thwart discovery obligations by allowing that operation to
continue in order to destroy specific stored information that it is re53
quired to preserve.”
54
Broccoli v. Echostar Communications Corp. illustrates the type of
conduct that would not be protected by Rule 37(e). In that case, a
motion for sanctions was brought against defendant employer
Echostar Communications Corporation (“Echostar”) for destroying emails that would have been relevant to the Title VII sexual harassment and retaliation claims brought against Echostar by the plain55
tiff.
Echostar’s e-mail retention policy consisted of automatically
transferring all of an employee’s sent e-mails after seven days to a “de56
leted items” folder, which in turn was purged fourteen days later.
57
Once purged, these e-mails were irretrievable. The court opined
that this e-mail system, though “extraordinary” and “risky,” could
58
have an arguably defensible business justification. However, since
Echostar was on notice of potential litigation, it had an obligation to
59
interfere with the automatic destruction of e-mails.
The court
stated: “Echostar clearly acted in bad faith in its failure to suspend its
e-mail and data destruction policy or preserve essential personnel

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Id. at 169–70.
See infra Part III.B.1.c.ii.1.
SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 17, at 169.
Id.
229 F.R.D. 506 (D. Md. 2005).
Id. at 509.
Id. at 510.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 510–13.
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documents in order to fulfill its duty to preserve the relevant docu60
mentation for purposes of potential litigation.”
D. The Exception: What Constitutes an “Exceptional Circumstance”?
Rule 37(e) will not apply if exceptional circumstances warrant
61
the imposition of sanctions. This exception allows the party seeking
sanctions to override the safe harbor if it can establish that the circumstances under which the information was lost necessitate sanctions, even though the party responsible for the loss has satisfied the
three elements of Rule 37(e). The Judicial Committee does not outline the scope of an “exceptional circumstance” except to state that it
is one in which “a court should provide remedies to protect an entirely innocent party requesting discovery against serious prejudice
62
arising from the loss of potentially important information.”
Courts applying “exceptional” or “extraordinary” circumstance
provisions in other contexts have ordinarily examined circumstantial
evidence, such as patterns of behavior or badges of untruthfulness.
63
For example, in Campbell v. Spectrum Automation Co., the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a lower court’s decision
that—even though a party’s conduct did not amount to bad faith or
an intent to defraud—the party’s general dishonesty amounted to an
64
“exceptional” circumstance such that sanctions were appropriate.
65
In Advantacare Health Partners, LP v. Access IV, the court opined that
“extraordinary circumstances” exist “where there is a pattern of disregard for [c]ourt orders and deceptive litigation tactics that threaten

60
61
62
63
64

Broccoli, 229 F.R.D. at 512.
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 17, at 173.
601 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 251–52.
The district court suggested that the conduct of Campbell may not
have amounted to bad faith or intent to defraud the Patent Office.
However, the district court’s findings that Campbell was not the inventor, that his testimony was unbelievable, and that he was aware of the
facts surrounding the invention because of his relationship with Zimmerman were more than ample to support a determination of bad
faith on the part of Campbell for his inexplicable failure to respond
truthfully to the request for admission, which had the effect of prolonging the litigation in this suit. We agree with the district court that
such conduct was sufficient to justify classifying the case as “exceptional” and awarding attorneys’ fees to Spectrum. We find no abuse of
discretion or misapplication of the law.

Id.
65

No. C 03-04496 JF, 2004 WL 1837997 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2004).
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to interfere with the rightful decision of a case.” Both the Advantacare court and the Campbell court recognized that even when it appears that a party was justified in doing a particular act, facts generally related to the party’s conduct—such as patterns of behavior or
badges of dishonesty—may evince an exceptional circumstance.
Thus, in the context of Rule 37(e), if courts choose to apply the “exceptional circumstances” provision in the same way that the courts in
Advantacare and Campbell did, then they withhold the benefit of the
rule from parties which are found to repeatedly lose information,
without the appearance of bad faith, or from parties that have a history of dishonesty.
***
Rule 37(e)’s three-step foundation, and its embedded exception,
create a high hurdle for parties that wish to gain its protection. If we
were to visualize the prototypical candidate for Rule 37(e)’s application—a relatively sophisticated corporate litigant that has been operating a sizeable EIS with a legitimate business purpose for some time,
which finds itself embroiled in litigation, and in an effort to comply
with a discovery request, inadvertently destroys a document—it is difficult to imagine why a court might find the corporate litigant’s good
faith conduct worthy of punishment. To borrow from the criminal
law, the corporate litigant lacked the requisite mens rea to deserve
punishment. However, if under an exceptional circumstance it can
be proven that the document was lost to the detriment of the corporate litigant’s adversary, then it would not be surprising if a court
took action to remedy the evidentiary imbalance the loss created. In
sum, not only does Rule 37(e) appear to merely reflect our preexisting notions regarding sanctions, it distills the law regarding spoliation sanctions, rather than adding to it.
III. SAFE HARBORS FOR SPOLIATION SANCTIONS:
RULE 37(e) BY ANY OTHER NAME
An examination of prior case law reveals that many courts would
not have sanctioned parties for their good faith destruction of evidence, reasoning that a party should not be punished for destroying
67
Further, those courts that
evidence it did not intend to destroy.
66

Id. at *5.
See, e.g., Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Co., 62 F.3d 1469, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(holding that an order to pay an adversary’s attorneys’ fees is “fundamentally penal”
thus requiring evidence of misconduct); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 179
F.R.D. 622, 631 (D. Utah 1998) (holding that bad faith destruction of evidence is
predicate to an adverse instruction). See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion about
67
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have chosen to sanction parties for destroying evidence, even if destroyed in good faith, did so not for punitive purposes, but rather eq68
uitable ones, with the intent to level the evidentiary playing field.
Hence, courts will continue this practice with regard to electronic information, basing their authority to do so on the “exceptional circumstances” provision of Rule 37(e).
The law regarding spoliation of evidence is well developed.
“Spoliation” has been defined as “the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve property for another’s
69
use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.”
The law’s reaction to the destruction of evidence has two purposes.
One is to punish the improper conduct and the other is remedial,
functioning to level the evidentiary playing field or “place the risk of
an erroneous judgment on the party who wrongfully created the
70
risk.” Similar to a judge’s consideration of a criminal’s mens rea
when issuing a punishment, in spoliation cases the court matches a
party’s state of mind at the time the party destroyed the evidence with
71
an appropriate sanction. Sanctions against spoliators include dis72
missal of a suit for egregious destruction of evidence and orders to
pay the opposing party’s costs and fees for less flagrant intentional
73
conduct.
When the court is interested in leveling the evidentiary playing
field, punishing the spoliator plays less of a role in determining which
sanction to issue. In those instances, the court is more concerned
with the prejudice that was caused to the non-destroying party by the

sanctions courts impose on parties that lose evidence and the requisite states of mind
associated with each sanction.
68
See, e.g., Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108
(2d Cir. 2002) (holding that an adverse inference instruction is an “appropriate
mechanism for restoring the evidentiary balance” caused by the loss of evidence—
even without a finding of “moral culpability”) (quoting Turner v. Hudson Transit
Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
69
West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1401 (6th ed. 1990)).
70
Id.; see also Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 74 (“The concept of an adverse inference as a
sanction for spoliation is based on two rationales. The first is remedial . . . [and]
[t]he second is punitive.”). The sanctioning of improper conduct for punitive purposes performs a dual role in that it might serve as a deterrent for future improper
conduct. See West, 167 F.3d at 779.
71
See DaimlerChrysler Motors v. Bill Davis Racing, Inc., No. Civ.A. 03-72265, 2005
WL 3502172, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2005).
72
Krumwiede v. Brighton Assocs., No. 05 C 3003, 2006 WL 1308629, at *11 (N.D.
Ill. May 8, 2006).
73
Broccoli v. Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506, 512 (D. Md. 2005).
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74

loss of the evidence. A common evidentiary sanction is the adverse
75
inference instruction, which is sometimes called a “spoliation in76
struction.” An adverse inference instruction is an instruction to the
jury that it may presume that the evidence that was destroyed would
77
have been unfavorable to the party that destroyed it. The adverse
inference instruction is a classic sanction employed against the spoliation of evidence “as illustrated by that favorite maxim of law, omnia
78
presumuntur contra spoliaterum” —all is presumed against the spoliator.
Under federal law, courts derive their power to sanction a party
79
from two sources of authority. First, all courts are vested with an inherent “power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their
80
presence, and submission to their lawful mandates.” This power is
not governed by statute, but rather is necessarily implied from the na81
ture of the institution. Consequently, these powers “cannot be dispensed with in a [c]ourt, because they are necessary to the exercise of
82
In fact, the Supreme Court of the United States has
all others.”
held that the federal rules “are not substitutes for the inherent
83
power[s].” The significance of this characteristic of the court’s inherent power is that Rule 37(e) does not disturb this authority.
74

See DaimlerChrysler, 2005 WL 3502172, at *1 (“A sanction may be appropriate
‘regardless of whether the evidence is lost as the result of a deliberate act or simple
negligence, [as] the other party is unfairly rejudiced . . . .’” (quoting Brenner v. Colk,
573 N.W.2 65, 70 (Mich Ct. App. 1997))).
75
See Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 77.
In order to remedy the evidentiary imbalance created by the destruction of evidence, an adverse inference may be appropriate even in
the absence of a showing that the spoliator acted in bad faith. However,
where the destruction was negligent rather than willful, special caution
must be exercised to ensure that the inference is commensurate with
information that was reasonably likely to have been contained in the
destroyed evidence.
Id.
76
Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759,
at *5–6 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997).
77
See Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 74.
78
Pastorello v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 470 (CSH), 2003 WL 1740606, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003) (quoting West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776,
779 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
79
Under state law, parties can be held criminally liable and liable in tort for destruction of evidence. Lawyers may also be held liable for destruction of evidence
under ethics rules.
80
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc, 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821)).
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 46.
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Rule 37(e) does apply, however, to the court’s alternate source
84
of authority to sanction spoliators: Rule 37. Rule 37 outlines both
the procedures and the remedies for dealing with parties that do not
cooperate in discovery. Although nowhere in the rule is there any
reference to loss or destruction of evidence, the rule is commonly
85
used to impose sanctions for spoliation.
There are four methods to obtain sanctions under Rule 37 for
86
the loss of information. One method is through a combination of
subsection (a) and (b)(2) of Rule 37: the non-violating party must
move for an order to compel under 37(a) and then the court must
87
rule that the order was violated under Rule 37(b)(2). The second
method requires the court to rule that a previously standing court
88
order was violated pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2). The third method,
pursuant to Rule 37(c), requires a failure to comply with mandatory
89
disclosures under Rule 26(a) and (e)(1).
The final method requires a failure of a party to serve a response to a request made under
90
Rule 34.
A. Rule 37(a): Motions to Compel and Sanctions
Rule 37(a) allows parties to file a motion with the court seeking
91
an order compelling an opposing party to produce documents. Parties would typically employ this rule when they have sought discovery
92
pursuant to Rule 34, but their adversary has refused to comply.
Therefore, if a party suspects that an opposing party has destroyed or
otherwise lost information, the party may first move for an order to

84

FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
See, e.g., Wiginton v. Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 WL 22439865, at *3 n.5 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 27, 2003).
86
FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
87
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)–(b).
88
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b). The analysis under the second method will be coextensive with the first method, since the “order” requirement under this method
can, but need not, originate from a motion to compel discovery under Rule 37(a).
89
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c).
90
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d).
91
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a) (“On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a
party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery.”).
92
FED. R. CIV. P. 34. This rule allows parties to request documents, things, and
entry upon land for inspection. Id. The rule does not require the intervention of
the court for a request to be made. Id. If the party served with the document request objects to the request or any part thereof, then the requesting party may move
for an order to compel disclosure under Rule 37(a). Id.
85
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93

compel pursuant to Rule 37(a).
Although this subsection of the
rule does not afford sanctions for the failure to produce the documents in question, it does allow the successful movant to seek sanctions in the form of payment for “reasonable expenses incurred in
94
making the motion, including attorney’s fees.”
Rule 37(e) could theoretically shield litigants from paying the
costs and fees associated with a Rule 37(a) motion. For example,
suppose Party X moves to compel Party Y to produce a document,
and the court, accepting the motion, orders Party Y to comply. In attempting to comply, however, Party Y loses the information he was
ordered to produce as a result of a good faith operation of a routine
EIS. Under Rule 37(e), Party Y will probably not have to pay the costs
and fees associated with Party X’s motion to compel.
However, Rule 37(a) already has a safe harbor provision of its
own that shields Party Y just as effectively as, if not more than, Rule
95
37(e)’s protections.
Under Rule 37(a)(5)(A)(ii), parties may escape sanctions if they can prove that their nondisclosure was “sub96
stantially justified.” The Supreme Court has held that the standard
for determining whether resistance to a motion to compel is “substantially justified” is rather low, requiring merely that there be a
“genuine dispute” or that “reasonable people could differ as to [the
appropriateness of the contested action],” as opposed to requiring a
97
“high degree” of justification.
Consequently, the protections provided by Rule 37(e) as to sanctions under 37(a) are redundant. A party seeking the protection of
Rule 37(e) from Rule 37(a) sanctions would have to satisfy the rigid
framework imposed by Rule 37(e). By contrast, a party seeking protection using the “substantially justified” provision of Rule 37(a)
would merely have to demonstrate that “reasonable people could differ” as to the propriety of the act which led to information being

93

See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 90 F.R.D. 613,
620–21 (N.D. Ill. 1981). Plaintiff sought an order to compel pursuant to Rule 37(a)
after suspecting that relevant documents had been destroyed. Id.
94
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5).
95
See id. 37(a)(5)(A).
96
Id. (“If the motion [to compel] is granted . . . the court must . . . require the
party . . . whose conduct necessitated the motion . . . to pay the movant’s reasonable
expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees . . . [unless]
the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially
justified . . . .”).
97
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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98

lost —arguably, a lower threshold than Rule 37(e)’s “good faith” requirement.
B. Rule 37(b)(2): Sanctions for Failing to Comply with an Order
99

Rule 37(b)(2) has two parts.
The first part, the “violation
stage,” outlines the circumstances under which this rule is applicable.
Essentially, the only element which exists at the violation stage is the
violation of a court order. Although at first blush this element appears unambiguous, a large body of case law interpreting this element has developed since the promulgation of the rule, including a
number of circuit splits. Therefore, to fully understand how Rule
37(e) will interact with Rule 37(b)(2), Part III.B.1, below, consists of
a thorough delineation of how courts have interpreted the rule and
what consequences these interpretations will have on how Rule 37(e)
will be applied in those jurisdictions.
The second part of Rule 37(b)(2), the “sanction stage,” lists the
different types of sanctions that a court may choose to employ against
a party that has been found to be in violation of a discovery order in
the violation stage. Courts have diverged on how to apply these sanctions, therefore in Part III.B.2 these differences will be discussed and
the consequences they will have on Rule 37(e)’s application will be
explained.
1.

“The Violation Stage”: The Order Requirement

Once an order to compel discovery is issued, whether it be a result of a motion made under Rule 37(a) or sua sponte, the failure to
comply with that order can give rise to sanctions under Rule
100
37(b)(2).
This rule is used to sanction destruction of evidence
when the loss results in a party’s inability to comply with a court or101
To be sure, under this rule the court is sanctioning the party
der.
for violating a court order and not specifically for destroying evidence.
98

Id.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2).
100
Id. (“If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide . . . discovery, including an
order under . . . 37(a), the court . . . may issue further just orders.”).
101
Note that Rule 37(a) provides the means for a party to make a motion for an
order to compel an opponent to produce documents. Besides ordering the nonproducing party to pay for the costs and fees associated with that motion, Rule 37(a)
is not a source of authority for the court to sanction the underlying behavior which
led the moving party to file the motion in the first place. Rule 37(b), on the other
hand, does address the underlying behavior because it authorizes the court to sanction a party for failing to comply with a court order.
99
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The order requirement renders this rule a clumsy instrument to
employ sanctions for spoliation. Some courts hesitate to issue sanctions for spoliation pursuant to the rule, noting that Rule 37(b)(2)
does not specifically address evidence destruction, and prefer to em102
ploy their inherent powers.
As noted above, the destruction of evi103
dence is a classic annoyance of the courts and has been frequently
sanctioned pursuant to the courts’ inherent authority since long be104
fore the federal rules were promulgated.
Since Rule 37(b)(2) is not tailor-made for addressing evidence
spoliation, different jurisdictions justify their course of action based
on their interpretation of Rule 37(b)(2). For example, courts differ
105
in their understanding of what constitutes a “court order.”
Courts
also differ over whether a party must demonstrate a particular state of
mind or culpability level before they will be held liable for sanctions
106
under the rule. Finally, courts differ over whether an order can be
107
Since Rule 37(e), by defiviolated before the order is even issued.
108
nition, only applies to sanctions “under these rules,” how a court
chooses to interpret Rule 37(b)(2) will have an effect on whether
Rule 37(e) will be applicable.
a.

What Constitutes a “Court Order”?

A typical scenario in which 37(b)(2) is used to sanction spoliation involves a party’s destruction of evidence that was the subject of a
preservation order or an order to produce discovery. However, some
courts are more willing than others to find the existence of an “order” that was violated, which facilitates using 37(b)(2) for sanctioning
evidence destruction. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit takes a generous position, acknowledging that a party
could be found to be in violation of an order if they fail to produce
109
documents by the date on which they promised to deliver them. In

102

Pastorello v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 470 (CSH), 2003 WL 1740606, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
103
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
104
See West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d. Cir. 1999) (“It
has long been the rule that spoliators should not benefit from their
wrongdoing . . . .”).
105
See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
106
See infra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
107
See infra notes 115–47 and accompanying text.
108
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
109
Brandt v. Vulcan, Inc., 30 F.3d 752, 756 n.7 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Metro. Life
Ins. Co. v. Cammon, No. 88 C 5549, 1989 WL 153558, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 1989)).
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110

Brandt v. Vulcan, the court stated in dicta that it might consider an
111
There“agreement among the parties” as constituting an order.
fore, courts that are more likely to find that an order was violated are
also more likely to use Rule 37(b)(2) to sanction that violation, and
consequently, Rule 37(e) will play a larger role in those jurisdic112
tions. Stated differently, courts in jurisdictions that choose to apply
a broad definition of “order” are more likely to find individual instances of information loss that are sanctionable under Rule
37(b)(2).
b.

Which State of Mind Is Required?

Courts also differ on the state of mind required when a party violates the order. Some courts require that the party display “willful113
ness, bad faith, or fault.”
This approach, however, appears to be
the minority since the Supreme Court, in a landmark decision, held
that neither willfulness nor good faith should be considered when a
party violates a production order; willfulness and good faith are only
114
Nevertheconsidered when determining the appropriate sanction.

110

Id.
Id. at 756.
112
Recall that according to the plain language of Rule 37(e) the Rule applies only
to sanctions imposed under “these rules”—referring to the federal rules. Therefore,
in jurisdictions that are less likely to find that an order was violated and consequently
will not apply Rule 37(b)(2), the court might seek alternate avenues for sanctioning
the party—in which case Rule 37(e) will have no application.
113
Philips Med. Sys. Int’l v. Bruetman, 982 F.2d 211, 214 (7th Cir. 1992). The
holding in Philips Medical Systems may be a result of sloppy research: to support the
court’s proposition that an order be violated with “willfulness, bad faith, or fault,” the
court cites to Roland v. Salem Contract Carriers, Inc., 811 F.2d 1175 (7th Cir. 1987),
which holds that the sanction of dismissal can only be employed when there is evidence of willfulness, bad faith, or fault. Id. at 1179. These cases are distinguishable
because the Philips Medical Systems court considers state of mind when determining
the propriety of sanctions, while the Roland court considers state of mind when determining the type of sanction to impose, presupposing that sanctions are appropriate.
114
Societé Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A.
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208 (1958). The pre-1970 version of Rule 37(b) contained
language which indicated that sanctions were appropriate only if a party refused to
disclose evidence, rather than failed to do so. Consequently, some courts interpreted
this choice of language as indicating that for a party to refuse to obey a discovery order required a degree of willfulness, while a failure to obey, see, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P.
41(b), did not. See Roth v. Paramount Pictures Distrib. Corp., 8 F.R.D. 31, 32 (D.C.
Pa. 1948) (refusing to impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) because the party
did not willfully violate a court order). However, in 1958 the Supreme Court clarified this ambiguity by declaring that “a party ‘refuses to obey’ simply by failing to
comply with an order.” Societé Internationale, 357 U.S. at 208. Congress adopted Justice Harlan’s decision in Societé Internationale in its 1970 amendment to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, excising “refusal” and replacing it with “failure.”
111
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less, in those jurisdictions that do require willfulness, bad faith, or
fault, Rule 37(e) will be inapplicable since it protects only parties that
lose information in good faith. Thus, litigants charged with spoliation would not be liable in these jurisdictions anyway. For jurisdictions that do not consider scienter at the violation stage of Rule
37(b)(2), violations committed in good faith may be subject to sanctions, in which case 37(e) might have some applicability at the sanctions stage of Rule 37(b)(2).
c.

Does the Rule Encompass Pre-Order Violations?

Courts are divided on the issue of whether to find that a party
has violated an order if the information is lost prior to the issuance of the
order. The District of New Jersey has held that when documents are
destroyed prior to an order to produce, no violation occurs because
115
the party was unable to comply.
Other jurisdictions summarily refuse to use Rule 37(b)(2), a discovery rule, to sanction pre-litigation
conduct and choose to employ their inherent powers to sanction the
116
conduct instead.
Some jurisdictions put a more lenient judicial gloss on the rule
and indicate that a party which destroys information before a discovery order is issued can in fact be subject to sanctions for violating that
117
order.
Although at first blush this interpretation of the rule appears counter-intuitive, if not metaphysical, the basis for its rationale
118
is plausible. Courts that accept this approach to the rule, including
115

Struthers Patent Corp. v. Nestle Co., 558 F. Supp. 747, 765 (D.N.J. 1981).
See e.g., Beil v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 1994)
(“The court simply recognizes that Rule 37 is a procedural rule, and like all procedural rules, it governs conduct during the pendency of a lawsuit.”); Capellupo v.
FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 551 n.14 (D. Minn. 1989) (“Rule 37 does not, by its
terms, address sanctions for destruction of evidence prior to the initiation of a lawsuit or discovery requests.”).
117
See, e.g., Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (holding that sanctions are appropriate for pre-order destruction of evidence).
118
The approach is arguably supported by the Supreme Court in Societé Internationale, 357 U.S. at 207–08, in which the Court stated:
Indeed subsection (b) [of Rule 37] . . . is itself entitled ‘Failure to
Comply With Order.’ For purposes of subdivision (b)(2) of Rule 37,
we think that a party ‘refuses to obey’ simply by failing to comply with
an order. So construed the Rule allows a court all the flexibility it
might need in framing an order appropriate to a particular situation.
Whatever its reasons, petitioner did not comply with the production
order. Such reasons, and the willfulness or good faith of petitioner,
can hardly affect the fact of noncompliance and are relevant only to
the path which the District Court might follow in dealing with petitioner’s failure to comply.
Id.
116
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the U.S. District Courts for the Southern District of New York and the
Northern District of Illinois, indicate that if a party’s inability to comply with a discovery order is self-inflicted, then that party should not
elude sanctions for failing to obey the discovery order simply because
119
The keystone to sanctions for prethey were unable to comply.
order destruction under 37(b)(2) is the prerequisite that the violator
120
had some prior duty to preserve besides the order itself.
Notice of
121
Therefore, in
a pending litigation triggers that duty to preserve.
the few jurisdictions that expand the reach of Rule 37(b)(2) sanctions to pre-order, and sometimes pre-litigation, destruction of evidence, the courts limit the expansion by also requiring that the party
122
have a pre-existing duty to preserve that evidence.
The implication of courts that employ the doctrine of pre-order
spoliation of evidence is substantial and mirrors the effect caused by a
123
broader interpretation of “court order.”
In these jurisdictions, an
act of spoliation is more likely to be sanctionable under Rule 37. In
turn, this broad application of Rule 37(b)(2) translates into greater
numbers of spoliators that can avail themselves of Rule 37(e)’s safe
124
harbor.

119

Id.; see also In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May, 25 1979, 90
F.R.D. 613, 621 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding as inadequate a “self-serving” defense to the
destruction of evidence which stated that documents were destroyed prior to the issuance of a preservation order and therefore were not subject to the order).
120
See Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 438, 440 (N.D. Ill. 1976)
(ordering sanctions against defendant for defendant’s failure to properly respond to
interrogatories because relevant documents had been destroyed; the court held that
even though documents were destroyed by defendants before the complaint was
filed, the defendant was aware of the pendency of the suit, and therefore had a duty
to preserve that evidence); Stubli v. Big D Int’l Trucks, Inc., 810 P.2d 785, 787–88
(Nev. 1991) (applying a rule practically identical to Rule 37(b)(2), held that plaintiffs’ pre-trial destruction of evidence warranted sanctions pursuant to the rule because plaintiffs knew the evidence would be relevant to a potential litigation).
121
Broccoli v. Echostar Commc’ns, 229 F.R.D. 506, 510 (D. Md. 2005).
122
See, e.g., Alliance to End Repression, 75 F.R.D. at 440 (holding that sanctions for
destruction of evidence that occurred before suit was filed were appropriate because
at the time of the destruction the spoliators had knowledge, obtained from paid informants, that they would be sued).
123
See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
124
This broad interpretation of how Rule 37(e) should be applied mirrors the
broad interpretation some courts have of what constitutes an order. See supra Part
III.B.1.a. In both situations, the effect of the court’s interpretation is to broaden the
scope of acts that can be sanctioned using Rule 37(b)(2).
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Pre-order 37(b)(2) Application and the Court’s
Inherent Powers

When courts allow Rule 37(b)(2) to reach back in time to preorder acts, they in effect try to reconcile their Rule 37(b)(2) analysis
125
with an inherent powers analysis.
Under the inherent powers approach, parties charged with notice of litigation have a duty to pre126
Simiserve all information that may be relevant to that litigation.
larly, under the pre-order approach to Rule 37(b)(2), courts will find
a violation of an order resulting from a party’s pre-order loss of information only where that party had notice that what it lost would be
127
relevant to litigation in the future.
Recall that on its face, Rule
37(b)(2) applies in narrow circumstances where a court order is violated. These courts, however, create a back door to the rule through
which they can use the broad reach of the inherent powers analysis
while simultaneously flying the flag of Rule 37(b)(2). Thus, it behooves litigants in jurisdictions that apply Rule 37(b)(2) to pre-order
violations to understand their duty to preserve.
ii.

The Duty to Preserve: Triggering the Duty and the
Scope of Preservation

Two questions arise when courts analyze what evidence a party
must preserve: (1) when does the duty to preserve arise, and (2) what
128
should be the scope of the preservation?
The duty to preserve
arises “when the party is placed on notice that the evidence is relevant to litigation or when the party should have known that the evi129
Certainly, a party is
dence may be relevant to future litigation.”
placed on notice of its duty to preserve information when the court
explicitly orders that party to preserve a document or produce it to
130
the adversary. However, as mentioned above, duties to preserve are

125

As a general matter, using principles of a court’s inherent power to sanction
spoliation under the federal rules is not revolutionary; courts have indicated that the
analysis under the two doctrines is similar. Wiginton v. Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 WL
22439865, at *3 n.5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2003). Sometimes courts base their authority
to sanction concurrently on both their inherent powers and Rule 37. See Smith v.
City of New York, 388 F. Supp. 2d 179, 188–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
126
Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F.Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D.
Cal. 1984)).
127
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
128
Id.
129
Broccoli v. Echostar Commc’ns, 229 F.R.D. 506, 510 (D. Md. 2005) (citing
Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001)).
130
Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 73.
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sometimes triggered without formal discovery requests.
For exam132
ple, the filing of a complaint would inform the party of its duty.
When a party has, or should have, reason to believe that he will
be subject to litigation which may arise in the future, the duty to pre133
serve may be triggered before a complaint is filed.
In some cases,
the moment this pre-litigation duty is triggered is clear. For example,
if a party has actual knowledge that another party is poised to file a
134
Further, if a party intends to file suit,
suit, the duty is triggered.
naturally it would be charged with notice of its own action and its
135
duty to preserve would be triggered.
In other instances, whether a pre-litigation duty to preserve has
been triggered is more nebulous. For example, a party that is responsible for the injury of another party may reasonably anticipate
that it will be sued, in which case the duty to preserve will arise at the
136
time of injury. Facts which are not directly related to an injury may
refine a party’s notice of litigation that may arise in relation to that
injury. For example, if a party has been sued before on the basis of a
similar injury in the past, then once that injury occurs again, the party
137
should reasonably anticipate that it will be sued.
Once the duty is triggered, the party charged with the duty must
138
institute a litigation hold. A litigation hold covers those documents
131

Krumwiede v. Brighton Assocs., No. 05 C 3003, 2006 WL 1308629, at *8 (N.D.
Ill. May 8, 2006).
132
Id.
133
See Broccoli, 229 F.R.D. at 510.
134
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
135
See Struthers Patent Corp. v. Nestle Co., 558 F. Supp. 747, 765–66 (D.N.J.
1981).
136
Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 204 F.R.D. 425, 430 (E.D. Ark. 2001) (noting
that “[w]hen there is a death or serious injury in a collision, the Defendant knows
within reason that a personal injury or death claim may be made”).
137
See Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 547 (D. Minn. 1989). But see Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759, at *4 (E.D.
Ark. Aug. 29, 1997).
[T]o hold that a corporation is under a duty to preserve all e-mail potentially relevant to any future litigation would be tantamount to holding that the corporation must preserve all e-mail. . . . Any corporation
the size of Defendant (or even much smaller) is going to be frequently
involved in numerous types of litigation. . . . Arguably, most e-mails, excluding purely personal communications, could fall under the umbrella of ‘relevant to potential future litigation.’ . . . [I]t would be necessary for a corporation to basically maintain all of its e-mail. Such a
proposition is not justified.
Id.
138
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Once a
party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document reten-
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which “are relevant to litigation, or potential litigation, or are rea139
sonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”
This is an objective standard because it is based on what information
a litigant reasonably calculates will lead to discovery, as opposed to
140
what the litigant believes is relevant.
The obligation to enact a litigation hold can appear to impose a
Herculean task on parties anticipating, or embroiled in, litigation. A
party may face the difficult choice between interrupting the routine
operation of its business and potentially exposing itself to sanctions in
141
the future.
Recognizing the predicament, some courts have provided some breathing room. For instance, the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois has instructed that a party “does not
142
The
have to preserve every single scrap of paper in its business.”
court also stated that “[a] party does not have to go to ‘extraordinary
143
measures’” to preserve all potential evidence.
Judge Scheindlin of
the Southern District of New York indicated in Zubulake v. UBS War144
burg LLC that a party does not need to preserve all its backup tapes,
145
which are generally used for disaster recovery. In fact, the Supreme
Court has held that document retention policies “which are created
in part to keep certain information from getting into the hands of
others . . . are common in business” and that “[i]t is, of course, not
wrongful for a manager to instruct his employees to comply with a
146
valid document retention policy under ordinary circumstances.”

tion/destruction policy and put in place a ‘litigation hold’ to ensure the preservation
of relevant documents.”). A “litigation hold,” also known as a “legal hold,” is “a
communication issued as a result of current or anticipated litigation, audit, government investigation or other such matter that suspends the normal disposition or
processing of records.” THE SEDONA CONF., supra note 27, at 94.
139
Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D.
Cal. 1984).
140
Wiginton v. Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 WL 22439865, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27,
2003) (“A party cannot destroy documents based solely on its own version of the
proper scope of the complaint.” (quoting Diersen v. Walker, No. 00 C 2437, 2003 WL
21317276, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 2003))).
141
See THE SEDONA CONF., supra note 27, at 45 (“[i]n particular circumstances,
implementing a legal hold may also require a change to the organization’s backup
procedures for business continuation or disaster recovery”).
142
Wiginton, 2003 WL 22439865, at *4 (citing Danis v. USN Commc’ns, Inc., No.
98 C 7482, 2000 WL 1694325, at *32 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2000)).
143
Id. (citing China Ocean Shipping (Group) Co. v. Simone Metals Inc., No. 97 C
2694, 1999 WL 966443, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1999)).
144
220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
145
Id. at 217.
146
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005).
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However, that policy must be suspended when a litigation hold is put
147
in place.
The intricacies and vagaries of the duty to preserve discussed
above, such as when the duty arises and what the duty encompasses,
provide a fertile landscape for litigation. Although strictly limiting
Rule 37(b)(2) to post-order destruction of evidence may shorten the
court’s reach to what otherwise may be sanctionable behavior, the
limitation leads to less litigation when strictly enforced and fewer instances in which Rule 37(e) will be available for parties that have lost
information in good faith. Conversely, in the jurisdictions in which
courts have expanded Rule 37(b)(2) to pre-order destruction of evidence, more parties will be able to make use of Rule 37(e).
2.

“Sanctions Stage”

Once a court has ruled that sanctions are warranted, it must determine which sanctions are appropriate. Rule 37(b)(2) sets forth
nine types of sanctions available for courts to levy against parties that
148
violate discovery orders, eight of which may be imposed on parties
149
in the context of lost information.
The sanctions range in severity
from paying the opposing party’s expenses to a dismissal or default
150
As mentioned above, in issuing sanctions, the courts’
judgment.
151
objectives are both punitive and remedial.
District courts have
“broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate sanction” in cases involving the non-production of evidence, and their decision can be
overturned on appeal only if the reviewing court finds the lower
152
court abused its discretion.
The factors that some courts consider when determining which
sanctions are appropriate include the spoliator’s degree of fault, the
opposing party’s degree of prejudice, and the effectiveness of the
sanction in deterring similar future conduct and in remedying the
153
substantial unfairness caused to the opposing party.
Some courts
tend to focus more or less on a single factor. For example, in the
Fifth Circuit, courts focus on the intentional conduct of the spolia147

Broccoli v. Echostar Commc’ns, 229 F.R.D. 506, 510 (D. Md. 2005).
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)–(C).
149
Id. Rule 37(b)(2)(B) relates to a party’s failure to produce another for examination under Rule 35(a).
150
Id.
151
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
152
Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.
2002).
153
See, e.g., Getty Props. Corp. v. Raceway Petroleum, Inc., No. Civ.A.99-CV4395DMC, 2005 WL 1412134, at *2 (D.N.J. June 14, 2005).
148
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154

tor. In the Sixth Circuit, courts look to state law when determining
155
The Supreme Court has
whether certain sanctions are proper.
ruled, however, that the most severe sanction under Rule 37(b)(2),
dismissal or default judgment, should never be imposed on a party
when its noncompliance was due to “inability, and not to willfulness,
156
bad faith, or any fault of petitioner.”
As for the less severe sanctions, jurisdictions are divided over
how and when they should be applied. For example, an adverse inference instruction requires intentional destruction in some jurisdic157
In the District of Utah, a court has held
tions while not in others.
that an adverse inference instruction, a sanction available under Rule
37(b)(2)(A), “must be predicated on the bad faith of the party de158
Some would argue that by definition, an adstroying the records.”
verse inference can be imposed only against parties that destroy evidence intentionally. The rationale supporting that argument is that
when a party intentionally destroys a document, it does so because
159
Therefore, it
the document would have been harmful to its case.
follows logically that if a party destroys evidence negligently or in
good faith, then there is no reason to believe that the destroyed evidence would have been harmful to that party. Consequently, in jurisdictions that follow the intent-based approach, parties that lose information in good faith will not be sanctioned with an adverse
inference instruction. In turn, Rule 37(e), which only protects good
faith loss, would offer a safe harbor to parties that do not need it.

154

MARGARET M. KOESEL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL, SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE:
SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 271 (2d.
ed. 2005).
155
Id. at 274.
156
Societé Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A.
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958).
157
Compare Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 179 F.R.D. 622, 631 (D. Utah 1998)
(holding that bad faith destruction of evidence is predicate to an adverse inference
instruction), with Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99,
108 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that an adverse inference instruction may be based on a
showing of negligence rather than bad faith or gross negligence).
158
Procter & Gamble Co., 179 F.R.D. at 631 (quoting Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112
F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotations omitted); see also Mathis v.
John Morden Buick, Inc. 136 F.3d 1153, 1155 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a showing of bad faith was necessary before an adverse inference instruction would be issued).
159
Procter & Gamble Co., 179 F.R.D. at 631 (noting “mere negligence in losing or
destroying a document does not support an inference that the party was conscious of
a weakness in its case, the ‘adverse inference must be predicated on bad faith of the
party destroying the records.’” (quoting Aramburu, 112 F.3d at 1407)).
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In other jurisdictions—instead of using an intent-based rationale
for imposing an adverse inference instruction—courts focus more on
the damage done to the party that did not destroy the documents.
160
For example, in Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial Corp.,
the court explained:
[The] sanction [of an adverse inference] should be available even
for the negligent destruction of documents if that is necessary to
further the remedial purpose of the inference. It makes little difference to the party victimized by the destruction of evidence
whether that act was done willfully or negligently. The adverse inference provides the necessary mechanism for restoring the evidentiary balance. The inference is adverse to the destroyer not
because of any finding of moral culpability, but because the risk
that the evidence would have been detrimental rather than favor161
able should fall on the party responsible for the loss.

In jurisdictions that follow the evidentiary-based approach, therefore,
courts are more willing, under certain circumstances, to impose adverse inference instructions against parties that destroy evidence neg162
ligently. In fact, in Societé Internationale the Supreme Court stated in
dicta that a party which fails to comply with an order “due to inability,
and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of [its own] . . . will
163
[not] profit through its inability to tender the records called for.”
The Court went on to say that “[i]t may be that in the absence of
complete disclosure by petitioner, [a court] would be justified in
drawing inferences unfavorable to petitioner as to particular
164
events.”
When intentional destruction is lacking, courts typically require
the party seeking the adverse inference to establish, using “extrinsic
evidence of content,” that the lost information was prejudicial to the
165
Proving that destroyed evidence was prejudicial to the
spoliator.
party that destroyed it can be difficult since, of course, the party with
the burden of proof might not know exactly what was destroyed.
Therefore, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
160

306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002).
Id. at 108 (quoting Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 75
(S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
162
See Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 219
(1st Cir. 1982) (holding that an adverse inference was an appropriate sanction
against a party that had not destroyed evidence in bad faith and considered, among
other factors, the issue of fairness to the opposing party).
163
Societé Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A.
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958).
164
Id. at 213.
165
Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 77.
161
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York has opined that parties burdened with establishing prejudice
should not be held to “‘too strict a standard of proof regarding the
166
In New York National
likely contents of the destroyed evidence.’”
167
Organization for Women v. Cuomo, however, the Southern District of
New York recognized that too lax a standard of proof would be problematic as well because spoliators are not supposed to be punished
merely for depriving their adversary of “a pond in which they would
168
like to have gone on a fishing expedition.”
In the jurisdictions that regard the adverse inference instruction
as a measure to remedy the evidentiary imbalance caused by the loss
of information, and therefore are not as concerned that the party
committed the act in bad faith, it would appear that Rule 37(e) could
play a meaningful role in protecting parties that have lost information in good faith. However, application of the Rule 37(e) safe harbor in these instances may pose a dilemma for these courts. They will
be confronted with a situation in which evidence has been lost in
good faith, but the opposing party has succeeded to some extent in
demonstrating that the lost evidence was prejudicial to the spoliator’s
169
case, thus tipping the evidentiary scales in the spoliator’s favor. It is
plausible that under these circumstances, a judge that follows this rationale toward spoliation sanctions will find that “exceptional circumstances” exist such that a jury should be instructed on the adverse inference despite the spoliator’s satisfaction of the elements of Rule
37(e). This application of the “exceptional circumstances” doctrine
is consistent with past applications of the doctrine, where courts have
held that exceptional circumstances may lead a court to take a course
different from what is expected of it because the totality of the cir170
cumstances demand the court to do so.
Besides dismissal or default judgment and adverse inference instructions, Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes a court to order the offending
party to pay any of its adversary’s costs and fees that were caused by

166

Pastorello v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 470 (CSH), 2003 WL 1740606, at
*12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003) (quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 128 (2d
Cir. 1998)).
167
No. 93 Civ. 7146 (RLC) JCF, 1998 WL 395320 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1998).
168
Id. at *3.
169
Note also, however, that if the opposing party fails to establish that the lost information would have been prejudicial to the party that lost it, then the court will not
be convinced that the evidentiary balance has been disturbed and will thus refrain
from instructing the jury on an adverse inference. Therefore, Rule 37(e) would be
unnecessary in that case as well.
170
See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text.
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171

the failure to comply. However, just as in Rule 37(a), the costs and
fees provision of Rule 37(b)(2) disallows the award if the violating
172
party can establish that its failure was substantially justified. Therefore, as with Rule 37(a), the “substantially justified” provision functions as a “safe harbor” for parties whose failure to comply is in good
faith. Clearly, then, Rule 37(e) would not be of any use to parties that
wish to avoid paying costs and fees because the rule already contains
an instrument to protect such parties. Further, some courts have
held that, as a general rule, ordering a party to pay its adversary’s attorneys’ fees is a “fundamentally penal” sanction such that there must
173
be “clear and convincing evidence of the predicate misconduct.”
In those courts, since good faith destruction would not be penalized,
Rule 37(e) would have no function.
C. Rule 37(c): Sanctions for Failing to Disclose
Rule 37(c)(1) gives courts the authority to sanction parties that
fail to make disclosures which are required by Rule 26(a) or
174
26(e)(1). Rule 26(a) outlines three instances when parties to a liti175
gation must provide certain disclosures to all the other parties.
These instances include initial disclosures, disclosures of expert tes176
The disclosures are mandatory,
timony, and pretrial disclosures.

171

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
Instead of or in addition to the orders above, the court must order the
disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both, to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure,
unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances
make an award of expenses unjust.

172

Id.
Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Co., 62 F.3d 1469, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1).
If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required
by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or
witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial,
unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless. In addition
to or instead of this sanction, the court, on motion and after giving an
opportunity to be heard: (A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure; (B) may inform
the jury of the party's failure; and (C) may impose other appropriate
sanctions, including any of the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)(vi).

Id.
173
174

Id.
175
176

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)–(3).
Id.
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meaning that they must be provided even without having been re177
quested.
If a party fails to make a mandatory disclosure pursuant to Rule
26(a) or 26(e)(1), then Rule 37(c)(1) imposes an automatic preclu178
sion sanction. This means that a party that fails to disclose information is automatically forbidden from using that information at a trial,
179
hearing, or motion. Since it may be to the responding party’s benefit to withhold the information, when a party’s failure to disclose is
due to the loss of information, the preclusion sanction is ineffective.
In those cases, the rule provides for alternate sanctions, such as pay180
ing attorneys’ fees or issuing an adverse inference instruction. The
Advisory Committee Notes to this rule specifically state that when a
failure to disclose results from spoliation of evidence, the alternate
181
sanctions should be used.
The alternate sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1) are not selfexecuting, but rather are imposed after the party seeking the sanction files a motion and the party against whom sanctions are sought is
182
given an opportunity to be heard on the issue. The alternate sanctions are the same as the ones listed in Rule 37(b)(2), which include
183
adverse inference instructions and payment of costs and fees.
A unique feature of Rule 37(c)(1) that distinguishes it from Rule
37(b)(2) is that parties will only be found in violation if they do not
184
have a “substantial justification” for their failure. Recall that under
Rule 37(b)(2), a party that violates a court order is considered to
have failed to comply with the order, “whatever its reasons” are for
not complying, and that “willfulness[,] or good faith . . . can hardly
affect the fact of noncompliance and are relevant only to the path
177
178
179
180
181

Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1).
Id.
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s notes, 1993 amends., subdivision (c).
Preclusion of evidence is not an effective incentive to compel disclosure of information that, being supportive of the position of the opposing party, might advantageously be concealed by the disclosing party.
However, the rule provides the court with a wide range of other sanctions— . . . like [in the case of] spoliation of evidence, allowing the jury
to be informed of the fact of nondisclosure—that, though not selfexecuting, can be imposed when found to be warranted after a hearing.

Id.
182
183
184

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1).
Id. See supra Part III.B.2.
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1).
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which the District Court might follow in dealing with petitioner’s
185
In contrast, Rule 37(c)(1) directs a court to
failure to comply.”
consider at the outset any justifications a violating party might have
186
for failing to disclose.
“[W]hether a party’s failure to disclose was substantially justified
is a fact question to be decided on the totality of the circumstances.
In making this determination, the court considers all relevant factors,
including:” (1) good faith, (2) willfulness or negligence, (3) control,
187
and (4) surprise.
Therefore, the “substantial justification” provision functions as a “safe harbor” for parties that have failed to make a
188
The Advidisclosure despite attempting to comply with the rule.
sory Committee Notes to the rule indicate that this provision is included in the rule “to avoid unduly harsh penalties” which may be associated with the mandatory nature of disclosures under Rule
189
26(a). Just as in Rule 37(a) and the costs and fees provision to Rule
37(b)(2), the existence of a “substantially justified” provision obliterates the use of Rule 37(e). Any conduct that would be protected under Rule 37(e) would also have been protected by the “substantially
justified” provision of Rule 37(c).
D. Rule 37(d): Sanctions for Failing to Respond
Rule 37(d) is the final vehicle under Rule 37 that a party could
use to seek sanctions against an adversary for failing to provide lost
information. The rule provides, in relevant part, for sanctions against
parties that fail to answer or object to interrogatories submitted by a
party and parties that fail to serve written responses to requests for in190
spection.
If a party’s loss of information renders it unable to an185

Societé Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A.
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208 (1958).
186
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1).
187
GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 595–96
(3d ed. 2000).
188
See Hinton v. Patnaude, 162 F.R.D. 435, 439 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that
plaintiff did not violate the Rule despite untimely disclosure because plaintiff’s conduct exhibited no “bad faith” or “callous disregard” and plaintiff “made efforts to
conform with the Rules”).
189
FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s notes, 1993 amends., subdivision (c);
Hinton, 162 F.R.D. at 439 (“[The substantial justification provision] was meant to soften the impact with respect to initial disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1) . . . .”).
190
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d).
The court where the action is pending may, on motion, order sanctions
if: (i) a party . . . fails, after being served with proper notice, to appear
for that person’s deposition; or (ii) a party, after being properly served
with interrogatories under Rule 33 or a request for inspection under
Rule 34, fails to serve its answers, objections, or written response. . . .
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swer an interrogatory or respond to a request, then that failure could
191
lead to sanctions. As a threshold matter, a litigant must learn what
constitutes a failure to respond in the jurisdiction in which that party
seeks to apply Rule 37(d). Generally, partial answers are not sanctionable because parties may move to compel additional answers un192
der Rule 37(a). However, courts have held that “a response that in
193
substance disclaims responsiveness is sanctionable.”
Rule 37(d) is similar to Rule 37(b)(2) in that a prima facie showing of a failure to respond is all that is necessary before a court begins
194
to consider which sanction is appropriate.
The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1970 Amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that willfulness and other factors play a role in Rule
195
The notes go on to
37(d), but only in the choice of sanctions.
state:
[I]n view of the possibility of light sanctions, even a negligent
failure should come within Rule 37(d). If default is caused by
counsel’s ignorance of Federal practice, or by his preoccupation
with another aspect of the case, dismissal of the action and default
judgment are not justified, but the imposition of expenses and
196
fees may well be.

It is plausible that Rule 37(e) will provide some protection to
parties that have exposed themselves to sanctions for failing to respond to a document request because they have lost information that
would have enabled them to respond. However, as mentioned above,
in most jurisdictions a party can avoid being sanctioned for failing to
respond by simply giving a partial answer. The requesting party can
then seek an order to compel under Rule 37(a), which returns us to
the analysis of Rules 37(a) and 37(b)(2), above. In jurisdictions in

Sanctions may include any of the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)(iv). Instead or in addition to these sanctions, the court must require
the party failing to act, the attorney advising the party, or both to pay
the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances
make an award unjust.
Id.
191

See Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 17 (D.
Neb. 1985) (where plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to Rule 37(d) seeking sanctions
for defendant’s failure to respond to document requests submitted under Rule 34 as
a result of their destruction of certain documents).
192
JOSEPH, supra note 187, at 591.
193
Id.
194
FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s notes, 1970 amends., subdivision (d).
195
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
196
FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s notes, 1970 amends., subdivision (d).

DAVIDOVITCH_FINAL

1162

6/12/2008 11:55:30 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1131

which a court will not accept a partial answer and will go forward with
sanctions, the types of sanctions that Rule 37(d) proposes are the
same as those in Rule 37(b)(2). As discussed above, rarely are any
significant sanctions imposed on parties that have failed to comply
with their discovery obligations in good faith.
E. Sources of Authority to Sanction Other than Rule 37
Other areas of the law also demonstrate the justice system’s reluctance to reprimand a party that has lost evidence in good faith. In
jurisdictions that recognize the tort of spoliation, only a small fraction
acknowledge liability when evidence is lost negligently, and in those
cases there must be a further showing that the party prosecuting the
197
tort claim was impaired in its ability to prove its case in a prior suit.
Further, much of the criminal law with respect to the destruction of
evidence requires that the evidence be destroyed intentionally. Finally, ethics rules appear to hold a lawyer accountable for the loss of
evidence only when his or her involvement in the loss amounted to
bad faith conduct.
1.

Tort Liability

Some state courts recognize an independent cause of action
198
against a party that has destroyed evidence. However, “only a minority of state high courts have recognized [the] independent tort
199
claim.”
States that have recognized the claim are further divided
between those that recognize claims for intentional spoliation and
200
those that also recognize claims for negligent spoliation.
There is
general agreement that the elements of intentional spoliation consist
of: “(1) pending or probable litigation involving the plaintiff; (2)
knowledge on the part of defendant that litigation exists or is probable; (3) willful destruction of evidence by defendant designed to disrupt the plaintiff’s case; (4) disruption of the plaintiff’s case; and (5)
201
Since intendamages proximately caused by the defendant’s acts.”
tional spoliation requires intent on behalf of the spoliator to disrupt
197

This is similar to jurisdictions that issue an adverse inference instruction as a
sanction for good faith loss of information, but only when there can be an independent showing that the lost evidence would have been harmful to the party that
lost it. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. As had been postulated above,
such a scenario would elicit the “exceptional circumstances” provision of Rule
37(e)’s safe harbor. See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text.
198
See KOESEL & TURNBULL, supra note 154, at 81.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 82.
201
Id. at 88.
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the plaintiff’s case, it can be inferred that in these jurisdictions, if evidence is lost in good faith—for example, without intent to disrupt the
opponent’s case—the court would not find the spoliator tortiously liable for the destruction. This approach to tortious liability mirrors
the approach taken by courts which emphasize the punitive purposes
of sanctions for spoliation of evidence because in both cases the court
is focused on the intent of the destroying party to destroy the evidence. If evidence is lost in good faith, neither liability nor sanctions
are imposed.
As for the jurisdictions that recognize liability for negligent destruction of evidence, which consist of only four states and the Dis202
trict of Columbia, the tort requires:
(1) existence of a potential civil action; (2) a legal or contractual
duty to preserve evidence which is relevant to the potential civil
action; (3) destruction of that evidence; (4) significant impairment in the ability to prove the lawsuit; (5) a causal relationship
between the evidence destruction and the inability to prove the
203
lawsuit; and (6) damages.

In these jurisdictions, although a party may be held liable for negligently destroying evidence, even if it was acting in good faith, the opponent must still establish that the destruction of the evidence actually occurred. This approach mirrors the approach taken by courts
that focus on the evidentiary imbalance that is created when evidence
is lost, even when lost in good faith. Here, as in the sanction context,
besides a finding that the evidence was actually lost, the court also requires the additional element that the lost evidence caused the opponent an inability to prove their case. As postulated in Part II.D.,
courts applying Rule 37(e) in jurisdictions such as those focusing on
the evidentiary imbalance caused by spoliation will likely find that
evidence which tends to prove that the lost information impaired an
opponent’s case is an “exceptional circumstance” that requires a
sanction and militates against employing the safe-harbor protections
of Rule 37(e).
2.

Criminal Liability

There are many sources of criminal liability for destruction of
204
Generally, these statutes require that
evidence at the federal level.
202

Id. at 89 (“Only Alabama, Montana, Indiana, some Pennsylvania courts and the
District of Columbia presently recognize this tort.”).
203
Id. at 89.
204
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000) (prohibiting obstruction of justice); § 1505
(Supp. V 2005) (governing obstruction of agency and congressional proceedings); §
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the evidence be destroyed with intent. For example, § 802 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, promulgated in the aftermath of the Enron
and Worldcom scandals, attributes criminal liability to anyone that
knowingly destroys documents “with the intent to impede . . . the investigation . . . within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of
the United States” and provides that violators “shall be fined . . . [or]
205
imprisoned . . . or both.”
Further, Sarbanes-Oxley requires accountants to “retain corporate ‘audit or review work papers for a period of 5 years’” and makes
206
it a crime to “knowingly and willfully violate” that requirement.
Some argue that “it seems unlikely that prosecutors will use such resources to pursue ‘negligent or sloppy recordkeeping’ absent other
207
criminal conduct.”
3.

Model Rules of Professional Conduct

Lawyers’ ethical duties forbid them from destroying docu208
ments.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct indicate
that a lawyer “shall not . . . unlawfully . . . destroy . . . a document or
209
other material having potential evidentiary value.”
Although the
rule itself does not propound a culpability level, the comments to the
rule state that the “[a]pplicable law in many jurisdictions makes it an
offense to destroy material for purpose[s] of impairing its availability
in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be fore210
It can be inferred that since the destruction has to be for
seen.”
the purpose of impairing its availability, then a lawyer’s loss of information in good faith probably does not rise to the level of culpability
required for a lawyer to be in violation of this rule. Further, when a
lawyer has an obligation pursuant to a tribunal to preserve or otherwise produce evidence, the rule explicitly requires that a lawyer disobey that obligation “knowingly” before she may be held accountable
211
for the loss, thus exposing herself to disciplinary action.
***
1512 (Supp. V 2005) (governing witness tampering); and § 2071 (2000) (criminalizing willful destruction of records filed or deposited with federal courts or public offices, or by one having custody of such records).
205
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 802(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Supp. V 2005).
206
KOESEL & TURNBULL, supra note 154, at 111.
207
Id. at 112.
208
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Regardless of how a court chooses to address spoliation, sanctions are rarely imposed on parties that lose evidence in good faith—
precisely the only parties that can benefit from Rule 37(e)’s safe harbor. In those few instances where courts do decide to issue sanctions
when evidence is lost in good faith, they do so after a minimum showing is made that the lost evidence would be beneficial to the nonspoliating party. It may be difficult for that party to meet such a burden, since it can be impossible to know the content of the document
which is now lost. Rule 37(e)’s safe harbor may be of use in those
cases, but if the non-spoliating party succeeds in proving that the evidence was prejudicial, the court may consider the “exceptional circumstances” exception satisfied. In light of the “safe harbors” that
pre-date Rule 37(e), and which are still in force, it is doubtful that
Rule 37(e) will have much of an impact on how courts issue sanctions
in the context of inadvertent electronic spoliation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although electronic information is inherently different from
non-electronic sources of evidence, this difference does not disturb
the principles on which the law of sanctions for evidence spoliation is
based—punishing bad faith conduct and remedying evidentiary imbalances. These principles are the ultimate arbiters of whether a
party’s conduct requires the court to intervene, and the Judicial
Committee acknowledged them as such by including Rule 37(e)’s
“good faith” requirement and its “exceptional circumstances” provision. In the final analysis, Rule 37(e) will be most effectively used as a
quick-reference for how courts have always treated the types of evidence loss covered by Rule 37(e).

